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Taking the Ninth: A Victim’s Right of Privacy 
Sarah Tupper∗ 
In 2006, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District 
issued a writ of habeas corpus in a case involving two women who 
had been held in contempt of court for refusing to testify against their 
grandfather in the prosecution of the grandfather for the alleged 
molestation of the women when they were minors.1 The women 
refused to testify on the basis of their Ninth Amendment right of 
privacy and were jailed for contempt. The Eastern District ordered 
the women discharged, but did so without comment. The narrow 
issue raised in this Note is whether a person may “take the Ninth” 
and refuse to testify against a family member in a criminal 
proceeding based on a privacy right. The Ninth Amendment 
guarantees that “[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain 
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by 
the people.”2 The broader question is whether a person should be able 
to assert a privacy right emanating from any source in order to refuse 
to testify against a family member. 
Neither the United States Constitution nor the Bill of Rights 
explicitly mention a right to privacy.3 Yet the right to privacy is a 
hotly contested issue in both the state and federal courts.4 The United 
 
 ∗ J.D., cum laude (2008), Washington University in St. Louis School of Law; B.A. with 
honors (2004), University of Chicago. Sarah Tupper is a member of the Missouri bar and works 
as a criminal defense attorney at the Carlson Law Firm in Union, Missouri. 
 1. Because the women refused to testify, there was no evidence upon which the 
grandfather could be convicted, and the trial court entered a verdict of not guilty upon 
completion of the State’s evidence. The record was then closed, and therefore there is no 
citation. See MO. REV. STAT. §§ 610.105, 610.120 (2006) for statutes governing the closing of 
records in Missouri. 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
 3. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (“The Constitution does not explicitly 
mention any right of privacy.”). Similarly, no explicit right to privacy exists in the Missouri 
Constitution. Doe v. Phillips, 194 S.W.3d 833, 843 (Mo. 2006). 
 4. For example, a Westlaw search of “right of privacy” in the “ALLCASES” database, 
which contains all state and federal cases, yielded over 21,830 results before returning with the 
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States Supreme Court has long recognized such a right as emanating 
from other specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights and from the 
structure of the United States Constitution itself.5 The Court has 
acknowledged a right to privacy in cases involving marriage,6 
procreation,7 contraception,8 abortion,9 homosexuality,10 family 
relationships,11 and child rearing and education.12 Such a right has 
 
generic result of “10000 Documents,” which is the highest number of results a search in 
Westlaw can produce. Westlaw, http://www.westlaw.com (last visited May 17, 2008).  
 5. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (“[S]pecific guarantees 
in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help 
give them life and substance.”). The penumbra concept in law embraces a body of rights held to 
be guaranteed by implication in a civil constitution. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1155 (7th ed. 
1999). Some cases explicitly use this term while others allude to it. Compare Griswold, 381 
U.S. at 484 (“specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras”), with Poe v. Ullman, 
367 U.S. 497, 517 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“‘[L]iberty’ is a conception that sometimes 
gains content from the emanations of other specific guarantees . . . .”). The Constitution is 
structured to list certain enumerated rights, and the Ninth Amendment codifies the Framers’ 
intention that the list not be exclusive. See infra note 57. 
 6. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that miscegenation statutes 
adopted by Virginia to prevent marriages between persons of different races violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection and due process); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 
485–86 (holding that Connecticut law prohibiting married couple’s use of contraceptives 
unconstitutionally interferes with a “zone of privacy created by several fundamental 
constitutional guarantees.”). 
 7. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977) (recognizing one aspect of 
the “liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is “‘a right of 
personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy,’”(quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 
152), and that the decision whether or not to bear children is at the heart of this privacy right); 
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541–42 (1942) (holding forced 
sterilization of repeat criminals violates the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal 
protection, as procreation is a fundamental civil right). 
 8. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453–55 (1972) (holding that a Massachusetts 
statute prohibiting distribution of contraceptives to single persons to prevent pregnancy violates 
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “by providing dissimilar treatment for 
married and unmarried persons who are similarly situated”); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485. 
 9. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164 (holding that a “criminal abortion statute of the [then-]current 
Texas type, that excepts from criminality only a life-saving procedure on behalf of the mother 
. . . is violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 10. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–89 (2003) (holding unconstitutional a Texas 
statute criminalizing homosexual sexual practices within privacy of home). 
 11. Prince v. Massachussetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (explaining that the “family itself 
is not beyond regulation in the public interest, as against a claim of religious liberty” or 
privacy). 
 12. Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (holding that compulsory 
attendance at public schools violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of liberty which 
protects parents’ rights to direct children’s upbringing); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol28/iss1/14
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been discovered as emanating from the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, 
Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments, the structure of the Constitution, 
state constitutional provisions, and state victims’ rights acts.13 The 
Missouri Supreme Court has likewise found that a right to privacy is 
fundamental and protected by substantive due process.14 Missouri 
follows the United States Supreme Court in its test for determining 
whether a right or liberty is “fundamental”15 and hence protected by 
due process requirements. In order to be fundamental, the right or 
liberty must be “objectively, deeply rooted in the nation’s history and 
tradition and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that 
neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.”16  
In Missouri, neither the constitutional provision covering crime 
victims’ rights17 nor the victims’ rights statute18 explicitly give a 
victim of a crime the right to refuse to testify against an accused. This 
issue is particularly important in situations where the victim is 
reluctant to testify against a family member due to the sensitive 
nature of family relationships, embarrassment, and community 
stigma. Given the history and tradition in both the nation generally 
and Missouri specifically, a victim who refuses to testify against a 
family member ought to be allowed in some circumstances to do so 
on the basis of an asserted fundamental right to privacy.  
There are further complicating factors involved in the Missouri 
case cited at the beginning of this Note. The two women held in 
contempt for refusing to testify against their grandfather, as minors, 
had made statements to authorities regarding the alleged 
molestation.19 If they had taken the stand and renounced those 
previous statements, they could have been charged with perjury on 
the assumption that they were now lying to protect their 
 
(1923) (striking down a Nebraska law prohibiting the teaching of foreign languages in schools 
as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 13. U.S. CONST. amends. I, III, IV, V, IX, XIV. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 479, 484 (1965).  
 14. Doe v. Phillips, 194 S.W.3d 833, 843 (Mo. 2006). 
 15. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
 16. Phillips, 194 S.W.3d at 842. See also Palko, 302 U.S. at 325. 
 17. MO. CONST. art. I, § 32. 
 18. MO. REV. STAT. § 595.209 (2006). 
 19. See supra note 1. 
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grandfather,20 or charged with making false statements to the 
authorities in the first place. Missouri’s witness immunity statute 
would not protect the women from these charges.21 That statute does 
not provide immunity from prosecution for perjury, false or 
misleading statements, or contempt, even when incriminating 
testimony is compelled.22 In other words, in this case the issue of 
asserting a right to privacy was particularly important, as the women 
would not have been able to avoid testifying against their grandfather 
by asserting a Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.23 
 
 20. The perjury statute reads in pertinent part as follows:  
1. A person commits the crime of perjury if, with the purpose to deceive, he knowingly 
testifies falsely to any material fact upon oath or affirmation legally administered, in 
any official proceeding before any court, public body, notary public or other officer 
authorized to administer oaths. 
2. A fact is material, regardless of its admissibility under rules of evidence, if it could 
substantially affect, or did substantially affect, the course or outcome of the cause, 
matter or proceeding. 
MO. REV. STAT. § 575.040 (2006). 
 21. MO. REV. STAT. § 491.205 (2006). See infra note 24. 
 22. See infra note 27. The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District issued a writ 
of prohibition to prevent a circuit court judge from compelling a daughter to testify against her 
father for allegedly molesting her as a child after the daughter had asserted her right against 
self-incrimination under both the United States Constitution and the Missouri Constitution. Hill 
v. Kendrick, 192 S.W.3d 719 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006). The writ was issued largely due to the 
State’s failure to assure the court that the daughter’s answers “could not possibly incriminate 
her,” particularly in the absence of a grant of immunity. Id. at 720. Although the daughter 
claimed false declarations and reports among the potential offenses in which she might 
incriminate herself, which would not be protected by a grant of immunity, she also suggested 
that she might incriminate herself for statutory rape and for failure to report child abuse, which 
may not have been prosecutable after a grant of immunity. Id. at 721. Hill is thus not directly on 
point, but it is one of the very few cases which address the issue of an alleged victim refusing to 
testify against a family member. 
 23. A second complication involves Sixth Amendment issues. If an alleged victim makes 
out-of-court statements arguably incriminating the alleged abuser, but then refuses to testify, the 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him” is 
thereby implicated. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. If a right to privacy is asserted as a basis for 
refusing to testify against a family member, is the alleged victim then considered unavailable to 
testify, which in turn would allow her out-of-court statements to be introduced as evidence? If 
so, then the defendant’s right to confront witnesses against him guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment is in jeopardy. There is a body of scholarship regarding issues involving witness 
“unavailability,” out of court statements, hearsay, and the right of confrontation, but this issue is 
outside the scope of this Note. See generally Kurtis A. Kemper, Annotation, When Is Witness 
“Unavailable” for Purposes of Admission of Evidence Under Rule 804 of Federal Rule of 
Evidence, Providing Hearsay Exception When Declarant Is Unavailable, 174 A.L.R. FED 1 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol28/iss1/14
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These types of cases present three significant questions. First, is 
there is a fundamental right of privacy protected by either state or 
federal law? Second, if so, what is its source? Third, does it allow a 
victim to refuse to testify against a family member? Although the 
first two questions are central to the third and will be discussed, this 
Note centers on the third question: whether there is a right to refuse 
to testify against a family member based on a Ninth Amendment 
right to privacy. 
In Missouri, there should be a right to refuse to testify against a 
family member under certain circumstances. In the case described 
above, the court held two alleged victims in contempt of court, and 
they went to jail. Had there not been intervention by the Court of 
Appeals, Missouri law would have allowed the women to remain in 
jail until the end of trial, for up to one year.24 The policy 
considerations implicated by imprisoning the very people the state is 
trying to protect are enormous: it is bad policy to jail alleged victims. 
Although there is admittedly a tension between victims’ rights and 
the state and public’s interest in bringing perpetrators to justice, the 
complex issues involved in the family dynamic compel the 
conclusion that in certain cases, the victims’ right to privacy must 
outweigh the state’s interests. Family unity, protecting the rights of 
victims, and the negative repercussions that would otherwise result 
are among the reasons to allow victims to make choices about 
whether or not to testify against a family member. Moreover, the 
concept of privacy is within the scope of Missouri and federal law, 
 
(2001). This annotation predates the landmark decisions in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 
36 (2004), and Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006), which changed the landscape of 
Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. However, the discussion of “availability” in Kemper’s 
annotation largely survived this sea change. 
 24. The witness immunity statute provides: 
If a person refuses to testify on the basis of such person’s privilege against self-
incrimination after being given an order to testify under this section or produce 
evidence or other information, such person shall be adjudged in contempt and 
committed to the county jail until such time as the person purges himself or herself of 
this contempt by testifying or producing evidence and information as ordered, or the 
trial for which the person’s testimony was requested has concluded. In no event shall 
the length of confinement exceed twelve months. 
MO. REV. STAT. § 491.205(3). 
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and it can and should provide an adequate basis for asserting a right 
to refuse to testify against a family member. 
Part I of this Note canvasses the historical development of privacy 
jurisprudence, setting the framework for the discussion of privacy as 
a fundamental right. This includes the federal and state constitutional 
bases for privacy rights, as well as the interplay of victims’ right 
statutes, rape shield laws, witness immunity laws, privileges and 
constitutional provisions. Part II analyzes the issues introduced in 
Part I, and argues that in Missouri, a victim should have the right to 
refuse to testify against a family member under certain identified 
conditions, based on an asserted right to privacy. Part III concludes 
that the Ninth Amendment can provide a basis for this qualified right, 
and should not be overlooked by legal scholars and practitioners. 
I. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF PRIVACY LAW 
A. Historical Notions of Privacy 
The right to privacy has deep roots in American jurisprudence, 
and emanates from tort, property, and contract law. One 
commentator, R. T. Kimbrough, has stated that, although the 
underpinnings of privacy rights have a lengthy ancestry, 
[I]t was not until the publication in 1890 of the article by 
Warren and Brandeis . . . that the right was introduced and 
defined as an independent right and the distinctive principles 
upon which it is based were formulated. The writer can think 
of no other instance in Anglo-American law in which a whole 
category of legal rights has been synthesized at one stroke, as 
was the case with the right of privacy. The article by Warren 
and Brandeis “enjoys the unique distinction of having initiated 
and theoretically outlined a new field of jurisprudence.”25 
There have been many definitions and characterizations of a right 
of privacy. It includes the right to be “let alone”;26 to be free from 
 
 25. R.T. Kimbrough, Annotation, Right of Privacy, 138 A.L.R. 22, 25 (1942) (citing 
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890)) 
(quoting Basil W. Kacedan, The Right of Privacy, 12 COLUM. L. REV. 693 (1932)). 
 26. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol28/iss1/14
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unwarranted and undesired publicity;27 to live one’s life in 
seclusion;28 and to live without unwarranted interference by the 
public about matters with which the public is not necessarily 
concerned.29  
The right to privacy has been described as “the absolute right of 
every person not to be interfered with to his distress, discomfort, or 
damage. Every person has the right to demand that his private, 
personal affairs should not be commented upon or scrutinized in 
public without his consent.”30  
B. Federal and State Right to Privacy 
Due process provides heightened protection against governmental 
interference with rights and liberties identified as fundamental, such 
as the rights to marry,31 have children,32 direct the education and 
upbringing of one’s children,33 marital privacy,34 contraception,35 
bodily integrity,36 and abortion.37 Many of these areas have explicitly 
been identified as fundamental because they are within a “zone of 
 
(dissenting from the Court’s holding that the use in criminal trial of evidence of private phone 
conversations between defendants and others, obtained by means of wire tapping, does not 
violate the Fourth or Fifth Amendments), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 
(1967). 
 27. Banks v. King Features Syndicate, 30 F. Supp. 352, 353–54 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) 
(identifying potential privacy right in X-ray images of plaintiff’s pelvic region); Jones v. Herald 
Post Co., 18 S.W.2d 972, 973 (Ky. 1929) (holding that publication of photograph in connection 
with incorrect quotation of plaintiff was not invasion of right or privacy, as there are times 
when one “becames [sic] an actor in an occurrence of public or general interest” such that one 
no longer has a protected privacy interest). 
 28. Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858, 859 (Tex. 1973) (holding that installation of 
wiretap device on petitioner’s telephone was an actionable invasion of right of privacy).  
 29. Brents v. Morgan, 299 S.W. 967, 971 (Ky. 1927) (holding that right to privacy was 
implicated when the defendant posted a large sign detailing the plaintiff’s failure to pay a 
delinquent account). 
 30. Kimbrough, supra note 25 (citing Kacedan, supra note 25, at 353). 
 31. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 32. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
 33. Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 
(1923).  
 34. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 35. Id.; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 36. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
 37. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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privacy.”38 One area identified in various jurisdictions as being 
within the realm of privacy is the family and home, although that 
privacy must yield when it seriously interferes “with the health, 
safety, rights and privileges of others, or with the public welfare.”39 
Even when such interference exists, privacy cannot be invaded 
“absent a persuasive showing of a close and substantial relationship 
of the intrusion to a legitimate governmental interest.”40 An 
expectation of family privacy is required before a right of family 
privacy attaches.41 The right of privacy is usually concerned with a 
protected relationship, not with any particular place.42 No state 
currently has any constitutional or statutory provision granting a right 
to refuse to testify based on a right to privacy, although a handful of 
states allow victims the right to refuse any interviews, discovery 
requests, or other pre-trial contact with defendants or defendants’ 
agents.43 
 
 38. The first time the United States Supreme Court used the phrase “zone of privacy” was 
in Griswold v. Connecticut, at the same time the penumbra concept was introduced to privacy 
jurisprudence. 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). See supra note 5. 
 39. 16B C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 1017 (2006) (citing Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 
(Alaska 1975)). 
 40. Id. For instance, in Ravin v. State, the Alaska Supreme Court held that possession of 
marijuana by adults at home for personal use is constitutionally protected because there is no 
persuasive justification for the governmental intrusion into a citizen’s right of privacy. Ravin, 
537 P.2d at 504. 
 41. C.J.S. Constitutional Law, supra note 39, at § 1017 (citing Drummond v. Fulton 
County Dep’t. of Family and Children Servs., 228 S.E.2d 839 (Ga. 1976)). In Drummond, the 
Georgia Supreme Court explained that since foster parents have no right to keep a foster child, 
they can have no expectation of family privacy, and thus cannot base a due process claim on a 
right of family privacy. 228 S.E.2d at 843.  
 42. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66 n.13 (1973). But cf. Stanley v. 
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (holding that a state may not intrude into a home for 
purposes of regulating the mere possession of obscene materials). In Paris Adult Theatre I, the 
Supreme Court distinguished the privacy right articulated in Stanley (namely, the right to 
possess pornography in the home) as being restricted to the home, whereas “the constitutionally 
protected privacy of family, marriage, motherhood, procreation, and child rearing is not just 
concerned with a particular place, but with a protected intimate relationship.” 413 U.S. at 66 
n.13. 
 43. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4433 (2006) (“[T]he victim shall not be compelled to 
submit to an interview on any matter . . . that is conducted by the defendant, the defendant’s 
attorney or an agent of the defendant.”); IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 22 (stating that crime victim has 
right “[t]o refuse an interview, ex parte contact, or other request by the defendant, or any other 
person acting on behalf of the defendant, unless such request is authorized by law.”); LA. 
CONST. art. I, § 25 (stating that victim has “the right to refuse to be interviewed by the accused 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol28/iss1/14
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The United States Constitution contains several amendments that 
implicitly encompass privacy rights.44 The First Amendment sets out 
individuals’ rights of free expression, as such expression relates to 
religion, speech, press, or assembly.45 Interpreting the First 
Amendment, the Supreme Court found it to contain the freedom of 
association as well as privacy within that association.46 The 
prohibition against the quartering of soldiers without homeowners’ 
consent is a type of privacy recognized by the Third Amendment.47 
The Fourth Amendment provides a right of persons to be protected 
from unreasonable searches and seizures of their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects: an explicit affirmation of a zone of privacy.48 It 
protects both the person and the home, and the privacy interests 
therein. The Fifth Amendment provides a privilege against self-
incrimination, as well as protection from deprivation of life, liberty or 
property without due process of law.49 The privacy interest in not 
disclosing one’s own guilt, and the privacy interest in one’s life, 
 
or a representative of the accused”); OR. CONST. art. I, § 42 (stating that victims’ rights include 
“[t]he right to refuse an interview, deposition or other discovery request by the criminal 
defendant or other person acting on behalf of the criminal defendant.”). For a helpful 
compilation of victims’ rights laws, see About.com, Crime Victims’ Rights by State, http: 
//crime.about.com/od/victimsrightsbystate/Crime_Victims_Rights_by_State.htm (last visited 
Oct. 14, 2008). 
 44. U.S. CONST. amends. I, III, IV, V, IX, XIV; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 
481, 484–85 (1965). 
 45. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble . . . .”). 
 46. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483; NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 
(1958).  
 47. U.S. CONST. amend. III (“No soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, 
without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by 
law.”); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484. 
 48. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”); 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961). Additionally, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by 
Justice White, wrote that “[t]he basic purpose of this Amendment, as recognized in countless 
decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary 
invasions by governmental officials.” Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967). 
 49. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall [any person] be compelled in any criminal case 
to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; . . .”); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (noting that the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments protect the “privacies of life”), overruled on other grounds by Warden v. Hayden, 
387 U.S. 294 (1967). 
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liberty or property is protected by these provisions.50 The Supreme 
Court has recognized privacy to be within one’s liberty interests on 
many occasions.51  
The Ninth Amendment reserves unenumerated rights for the 
people. The essence of the Amendment is that the absence of explicit 
mention of a right in the Constitution should not signal that such a 
right does not exist.52 The Ninth Amendment has been controversial 
since its proposal; because it grants no positive right, courts and 
scholars have struggled to define its scope, leaving it wallowing in 
legal obscurity.53 However, the Ninth Amendment was intended to 
reassure those Framers nervous about the ratification of the Bill of 
Rights that just because certain rights were enumerated did not mean 
that others did not exist.54 They did exist, the Framers insisted, and 
they were retained by the people.55 
 
 50. The Fourth and Fifth Amendments are often considered together as protection against 
all governmental intrusions into “the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.” Boyd, 
116 U.S. at 630. See also Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (referring to these “penumbral rights of 
privacy and repose”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 51. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599–600 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 
(1973) (“This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept 
of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action . . . or . . . in the Ninth Amendment’s 
reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether 
or not to terminate her pregnancy.”); Paris Adult Theatre I. v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65 (1973); 
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486; Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).  
 52. U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall 
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”); Griswold, 381 U.S. 486–
99 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (describing language and history of Ninth Amendment and 
illustrating Framers’ debate over the wisdom of adopting a Bill of Rights).  
 53. See infra notes 80–81. 
 54. James Madison, the drafter of the Ninth Amendment, acknowledged the danger 
inherent in enumerating certain rights, namely, that “exceptions to powers which [were] not 
granted . . . would afford a colorable pretext to claim more than were granted,” THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 513 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). He responded 
to these concerns in the following way:  
It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by enumerating particular 
exceptions to the grant of power, it would disparage those rights which were not 
placed in that enumeration; and it might follow by implication, that those rights which 
were not singled out were intended to be assigned into the hands of the General 
Government, and were consequently insecure. This is one of the most plausible 
arguments I have ever heard urged against the admission of a bill of rights into this 
system; but, I conceive, that it may be guarded against. I have attempted it, as 
gentlemen may see by turning to the last clause of the fourth resolution. 
I ANNALS OF CONGRESS 439 (Gales & Seaton ed., 1834). The “last clause of the fourth 
resolution” was an early draft of the Ninth Amendment, the text of which was:  
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The Fourteenth Amendment, in addition to extending the 
protections guaranteed by the United States Constitution to state 
action, also contains a Due Process Clause and an Equal Protection 
Clause.56 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
applies the Fifth Amendment protection against deprivation of life, 
liberty, or property to acts of the states.57 A right to privacy has been 
found to be a liberty interest substantively protected by this clause.58 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment59 ensures 
that, where one person has a privacy right, so too do all persons. This 
Clause is cited in cases involving homosexual conduct60 for the 
argument that where heterosexual couples have a right to privacy in 
their consensual sexual behavior, so too do homosexual couples.61 
Missouri’s Constitution contains provisions which parallel the 
Federal Constitution’s First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.62 Additionally, the Missouri Constitution contains a 
 
The exceptions here or elsewhere in the Constitution, made in favor of particular 
rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish the just importance of other rights 
retained by the people, or as to enlarge the powers delegated by the Constitution; but 
either as actual limitations of such powers, or as inserted merely for greater caution. 
Id. at 435. 
 55. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. See infra notes 81 and 84 and accompanying text. 
 56. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”); Doe v. Phillips, 194 S.W.3d 833, 843 
(Mo. 2006) (“[V]iolations of . . . rights not specifically set out in the constitution but inherent in 
the concept of ordered liberty are analyzed under substantive due process principles.”). 
 57. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”). 
 58. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 
(1923). 
 59. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.”); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574–75. 
 60. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 202–03 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing majority’s refusal to consider the Equal Protection Clause); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 
574–75 (discussing validity of Equal Protection Clause challenge to statute, but concluding that 
the Due Process Clause argument needed to be addressed in order to overrule Bowers). 
 61. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 202–03 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 62. Article I, section 2 of the Missouri Constitution provides: 
That all constitutional government is intended to promote the general welfare of the 
people; that all persons have a natural right to life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness and 
the enjoyment of the gains of their own industry; that all persons are created equal and 
are entitled to equal rights and opportunity under the law; that to give security to these 
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crime victims’ rights section in its Bill of Rights.63 Other states have 
explicitly included a right of privacy in their constitutions.64 
 
things is the principal office of government, and that when government does not confer 
this security, it fails in its chief design. 
MO. CONST. art. I, § 2. Compare id. with U.S. CONST. amends. V and XIV, § 1. Article I, 
section 5 of the Missouri Constitution provides: 
That all men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according 
to the dictates of their own consciences; that no human authority can control or 
interfere with the rights of conscience; that no person shall, on account of his religious 
persuasion or belief, be rendered ineligible to any public office or trust or profit in this 
state, be disqualified from testifying or serving as a juror, or be molested in his person 
or estate; but this section shall not be construed to excuse acts of licentiousness, nor to 
justify practices inconsistent with the good order, peace or safety of the state, or with 
the rights of others. 
MO. CONST. art. I, § 5. Compare id. with U.S. CONST. amend. I. Article I, section 8 of the 
Missouri Constitution provides “[t]hat no law shall be passed impairing the freedom of speech, 
no matter by what means communicated: that every person shall be free to say, write or publish, 
or otherwise communicate whatever he will on any subject, being responsible for all abuses of 
that liberty.” MO. CONST. art. I, § 8. Compare id. with U.S. CONST. amend. I. Article I, section 
9 of the Missouri Constitution provides, “[t]hat the people have the right peaceably to assemble 
for their common good.” MO. CONST. art. I, § 9. Compare id. with U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
Article I, section 10 of the Missouri Constitution provides, “[t]hat no person shall be deprived 
of life, liberty or property without due process of law.” MO. CONST. art. I, § 10. Compare id. 
with U.S. CONST. amends. V and XIV, § 1. Article I, section 15 provides: 
That the people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and effects, from 
unreasonable searches and seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or seize any 
person or thing, shall issue without describing the place to be searched, or the person 
or thing to be seized, as nearly as may be; nor without probable cause, supported by 
written oath or affirmation. 
MO. CONST. art. I § 15. Compare id. with U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Article I, section 19 of the 
Missouri Constitution provides, “[t]hat no person shall be compelled to testify against himself 
in a criminal cause.” MO. CONST. art. I, § 19. Compare id. with U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 63. MO. CONST. art. I, § 32. The provision provides crime victims the rights: to be present 
at all criminal justice proceedings at which the defendant has such right; to be informed of and 
heard at guilty pleas, bail hearings, sentencings, probation revocation hearings, and parole 
hearings; to be informed of trials and preliminary hearings; to restitution; to speedy disposition 
and appellate review; to reasonable protection from the defendant or defendant’s agents; to 
information concerning the escape, release, and scheduling of defendant’s release from 
incarceration; and to information about how the criminal justice system works, the right to and 
availability of services, and the nature of the crime. Id.  
 64. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22 (“The right of the people to privacy is 
recognized and shall not be infringed.”); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“Among these [inalienable 
rights] are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting 
property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.”). However, no state has 
granted victims an explicit right to refuse to testify, though a few have provided victims the 
right to refuse discovery requests by the accused. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1 (“[A] 
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C. Other Laws 
The Missouri Victims’ Rights Act, codified in Chapter 595 of 
Missouri’s Revised Statutes, grants various rights to victims and 
witnesses.65 Such rights are afforded to victims of dangerous felonies, 
such as murder in the first degree, voluntary manslaughter, and any 
attempt to commit any of these.66 In addition, upon written request, 
the rights are afforded to victims and witnesses of all other crimes.67 
Chapter 595 concludes by noting that the “rights of the victims 
 
victim of crime has a right . . . [t]o refuse an interview, deposition, or other discovery request by 
the defendant, the defendant’s attorney, or other person acting on behalf of the defendant.”). 
Many states, in fact, have included an affirmative duty to cooperate with the prosecution, or to 
report the crime, and at least one state requires victims to testify at trial. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
120/7 (2006) (“Victims and witnesses shall have the following responsibilities to aid in the 
prosecution of violent crime. (a) To make a timely report of the violent crime; (b) To cooperate 
with law enforcement authorities throughout the investigation, prosecution, and trial; (c) to 
testify at trial . . . .”). State cases are conflicted on interpretations of testimony requirements. 
Compare State ex rel. Dean v. City Court of Tucson, 844 P.2d 1165, 1166 (Ariz. 1992) (finding 
that Victims’ Rights Implementation Act “does not give the victim the absolute right not to 
testify at court proceedings.”), with State v. Boodry, 394 P.2d 196, 200 (Ariz. 1964) (“There is 
no constitutional requirement that the victim of any crime testify. . . . The right of confrontation 
conferred by [Arizona’s Constitution] is a right to confront witnesses not victims.”). An 
Arizona appellate court interpreted Dean, in a case where the defendant conceded guilt but 
challenged the seriousness of the crime during sentencing, as allowing compulsion of a victim 
to give testimony at a presentence hearing. Weiss v. Superior Court, 911 P.2d 633 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1996). 
 65. MO. REV. STAT. § 595.209 (2006). 
 66. Id. § 1. 
 67. Id. For victims, such rights include: the right to be present at all criminal justice 
proceedings at which the defendant has such right; to information about the crime; to be 
informed about changes to the docket; to confer with and be informed by the prosecutor 
regarding hearings, pleas, sentencing, etc., and to be heard at such hearings; to be informed of 
the status of the case, the availability of victims’ services, any release of the accused, or any 
escape of the accused; to be informed of similar occasions involving juvenile perpetrators of 
probation revocation hearings in juvenile cases; to be informed of the projected date of release 
from confinement, any release on bond, any release for other reasons, any scheduled parole or 
release hearings, any escape and subsequent recapture, any commutation or pardon of sentence, 
and the death of accused; to reasonable protection from defendant or defendant’s agents; to be 
informed of the right to restitution; to be informed of the procedures to be followed in order to 
apply for and receive any witness fee to which they are entitled; to have returned their property 
when no longer needed for evidentiary reasons; to be provided with creditor intercession 
services if unable to temporarily meet financial obligations as a result of the crime; to speedy 
disposition of their cases, and speedy appellate review; to be provided a secure waiting area 
during court proceedings; and to receive notification of any hearing conducted for 
reconsideration of sentence imposed. Id. Cf. MO. CONST. art. I, § 32. 
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granted in this section are absolute and the policy of this state is that 
the victim’s rights are paramount to the defendant’s rights.”68 
Missouri’s witness immunity law eliminates a witness’s ability to 
assert a self-incrimination privilege.69 It states that a witness may not 
refuse to testify on the basis of the witness’s privilege against self-
incrimination once immunity has been granted.70 Immunity is 
freedom from criminal prosecution or penalty, except that it does not 
prevent prosecution for perjury, giving a false or misleading 
statement, or contempt committed in answering or failing to answer.71 
The statute goes on to say that, should a person continue to refuse to 
testify after being given an order to testify, such person will be found 
in contempt, and jailed until she testifies, or until the trial concludes, 
but not longer than twelve months.72 
Missouri also has what is commonly referred to as a “rape shield 
law.”73 This law protects prosecuting witnesses from interrogation 
 
 68. MO. REV. STAT. § 595.209 (5) (2006). 
 69. Id. § 491.205. See also supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 70. § 491.205(1). 
 71. The statute reads in full as follows:  
In the case of an individual who has been or may be called to testify or provide other 
information . . . the judge . . . may issue . . . upon the written request of the prosecuting 
attorney an order requiring such individual to give testimony or provide other 
information which the individual refuses to give or provide on the basis of the 
individual’s privilege against self-incrimination. When such an order is issued, the 
witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of the witness’s privilege 
against self-incrimination, but after complying with the order and giving the testimony 
or producing the evidence compelled by the order, no such person shall be criminally 
prosecuted or subjected to any criminal penalty for or on account of any act, 
transaction, matter or thing which is the subject matter of the inquiry in which the 
person testifies or produces evidence, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false 
or misleading statement or contempt committed in answering or failing to answer, or 
in producing or failing to produce evidence in accordance with the order. 
Id. (emphasis added). See supra note 20 for Missouri’s perjury statute, MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 575.040 (2006). 
 72. MO. REV. STAT. § 491.205(3). See supra note 24. At least one state has expressly 
disallowed imprisonment for victims of sexual assault. CAL. CIV. PRO. § 1219(b) (2007) (“[N]o 
court may imprison or otherwise confine or place in custody the victim of a sexual assault for 
contempt when the contempt consists of refusing to testify concerning that sexual assault.”). 
However, a victim of domestic violence who refuses to testify must spend seventy-two hours in 
a domestic violence counseling program, or perform seventy-two hours of community service. 
Id. § 1219(c). 
 73. Mo. REV. STAT. § 491.015 (2006). 
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regarding prior sexual conduct.74 It reflects a concern with putting 
rape victims on trial by calling into question their past sexual 
behavior.75  
II. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL 
Although this Note identifies each of the potential bases for a right 
to privacy in order to show that such a right does indeed exist, the 
Note’s focus is on the Ninth Amendment for two reasons.76 First, 
because the Ninth Amendment is one of the most controversial 
amendments due to its scope and indeterminacy,77 it is often 
overlooked in constitutional jurisprudence as providing an 
independent basis for a holding.78 This judicial “ignoring”79 is 
 
 74. Id. 
 75. Many commentators have pointed out that without the protection of such a shielding 
statute, outdated and sexist notions of women “asking for” sexual contact by dressing 
provocatively or behaving promiscuously, which in turn “cause” men to rape them, will 
continue. See, e.g., Euphemia B. Warren, She’s Gotta Have It Now: A Qualifed Rape Crisis 
Counselor-Victim Privilege, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 141, 144 (1995); Clifford S. Fishman, 
Consent, Credibility, and the Constitution: Evidence Relating to a Sex Offense Complainant’s 
Past Sexual Behavior, 44 CATH. U. L. REV. 709, 711 (1995). Although not especially relevant 
to the issues explored in this Note, rape shield laws in other contexts may interact with privacy 
rights. 
 76. Another reason to address the Ninth Amendment is because it is the Amendment 
relied on by the women in the case described above that prompted this Note. See supra note 1 
and accompanying text. 
 77. “In sophisticated legal circles mentioning the Ninth Amendment is a surefire way to 
get a laugh.” JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 34 (1980). This author’s personal 
experience confirms this truism. 
 78. Chase J. Sanders, Ninth Life: An Interpretive Theory of the Ninth Amendment, 69 IND. 
L.J. 759, 761 (1994) (exploring the history of and reasons behind the neglect of the Ninth 
Amendment). See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 490–91 (1965) (Goldberg, J., 
concurring) (“While this Court has had little occasion to interpret the Ninth Amendment, it 
cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect.”) 
(citation omitted). 
 79. Prior to 1965, the Supreme Court had mentioned the Ninth Amendment in fewer than 
ten cases. See Livingston’s Lessee v. Moore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 469, 551 (1833); Dred Scott v. 
Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 511 (1857) (Campbell, J., concurring); Ashwander v. TVA, 
297 U.S. 288, 330–31 (1936); Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 143–44 (1939); 
United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 94–95 (1947); Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 
333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 492 (1957). In 1965, the Court 
decided Griswold v. Connecticut, which was striking not only because of the majority’s explicit 
recognition of a penumbral right of “privacy and repose,” 381 U.S. at 485, but also because of 
Justice Goldberg’s remarkable concurrence in which he explored the Ninth Amendment’s 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 457 Tupper book pages  10/30/2008 2:20:00 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
472 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 28:457 
 
 
puzzling and plays a special role in the area of privacy law.80 Second, 
the interplay between the Ninth Amendment and privacy suggests 
that privacy concepts may have as much bearing on how to interpret 
the Ninth Amendment as the Ninth Amendment has on how to 
interpret the right of privacy.81  
A. Analysis 
A victim’s refusal to testify most typically arises in three 
situations: (1) domestic violence cases; (2) crimes (often rape or other 
 
history in detail, and breathed new life into the Amendment. 381 U.S. at 486–99 (Goldberg, J., 
concurring). 
 80. Sanders, supra note 81, at 761–62 (exploring how the Court manipulates the Ninth 
Amendment to produce inconsistent results in privacy cases because of the Amendment’s 
malleability). 
 81. Sanders notes that:  
There seems to be but one simple reason underlying the Ninth Amendment’s neglect: 
it appears incapable of practical interpretation. No one has yet discovered a mechanism 
for empowering courts to identify the “other[] [rights] retained by the people” that 
does not dramatically swell the judiciary’s head on the three-headed hydra of 
American government. 
Sanders, supra note 81, at 761. Similarly, privacy, when addressed through amendments other 
than the Ninth, is treated as a particularly troublesome expansion of the concept of 
“fundamental” rights. In Bowers v. Hardwick, the Supreme Court refused to acknowledge a 
fundamental right “to engage in homosexual sodomy,” citing a distaste for expanding the Due 
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments beyond processes by which life, 
liberty, or property is taken. 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986). The Court said, “[a]mong such cases are 
those recognizing rights that have little or no textual support in the constitutional language.” Id. 
Ninth Amendment rights are unenumerated, and as such, do not provide the “constitutional 
language” the Court was seeking. But the reason the Ninth Amendment was included in the Bill 
of Rights in the first place was to ensure that the Justices did not limit the people’s rights to 
what was explicit in the “constitutional language.” See James Wilson’s speech at the 
Constitutional Convention: 
[I]n a government consisting of enumerated powers, such as is proposed for the United 
States, a bill of rights would not only be unnecessary, but, in my humble judgment, 
highly imprudent. . . . If we attempt an enumeration, every thing that is not enumerated 
is presumed to be given. The consequence is, that an imperfect enumeration would 
throw all implied power into the scale of the government, and the rights of the people 
would be rendered incomplete. 
THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1789 
(Jonathon Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836). This is a perfect example of the dangers of the legal principle 
“inclusio unius est exclusio alterius” (“the inclusion of one is the exclusion of another”). For an 
extremely thorough and detailed description of the history surrounding the ratification of the 
Bill of Rights and the role of the Ninth Amendment, see Sanders, supra note 81, at 763–73. 
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sexual misconduct) alleged against nonfamily members; and (3) 
where refusal to testify against a family member is based on a 
testimonial privilege (and the refuser is not the victim). There is little 
law or commentary directly on point regarding a victim’s privacy 
right in refusing to testify against a non-spouse family member, and 
so this analysis must extrapolate from three more typical situations, 
from public policy, and from the limits of what existing law can 
support. 
1. Domestic Violence 
A vast quantity of commentary addressing compelled testimony in 
domestic violence situations exists.82 Although it may seem 
counterintuitive at first glance, many advocates for victims of 
domestic violence favor compelled testimony, although they may 
differ on the acceptable consequences for refusing to testify.83 Valid 
concerns support these advocates’ positions, and are relevant to the 
topic of this Note. Specifically, these advocates are concerned about 
continued abuse resulting from coercion by the alleged abuser or the 
alleged victim’s family, or about the victim’s fear even absent 
express threats or coercion.84 Where testimony is compelled, victims 
of domestic violence who would otherwise be reluctant to testify can 
point to the law and the courts as the source of the alleged abuser’s 
problems. The blame is thereby removed from the victim and placed 
on the state, which reduces potential retaliation and in turn 
encourages victims to testify.85 Even where abuse is not likely to 
 
 82. For example, a Google search of the rather specific “‘domestic violence’ ‘compelled 
testimony’” yielded 576 hits, ranging from bar websites, blogs, online journals, and state and 
court websites, to name a few. See Google.com, http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q= 
%E2%80%9Cdomestic+violence%22+%22compelled+testimony%22 (last visited July 3, 
2008). 
 83. Compare Renee L. Rold, All States Should Adopt Spousal Privilege Exception 
Statutes, 55 J. MO. BAR NO. 5 249, 253 (1999) (advocating for contempt rulings against victims 
of domestic violence who refuse to testify, with community service and counseling, and 
possibly jail time, for refusal), with Sherry F. Colb, Helping Battered Women Without Holding 
Them in Contempt, FINDLAW, Sept. 25, 2002, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/colb/ 
20020925.html (suggesting an alternative to findings of contempt; namely, a hearsay exception 
to victims’ statements to police). 
 84. Rold, supra note 86, at 249. 
 85. Id. at 251. Rold argues that abusers are less likely to retaliate against the victim for 
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occur again, or where the victim has made the decision not to testify 
absent fear or coercion, many domestic violence commentators still 
promote compelled testimony based on the idea that domestic 
violence is violence against all women and society as a whole, rather 
than against any particular individual.86 Any past abuser who remains 
unpunished, under this theory, causes continual harm against society 
and represents an affront to the criminal justice system.87 
This theory is the most sharply criticized by commentators 
opposed to compelled testimony in domestic violence cases.88 One 
commentator, herself a survivor of domestic violence, writes 
passionately that domestic violence “is a crime committed by one 
individual against another. The way to empower victims is to restore 
and respect their choices, not to coerce them further.”89 These critics’ 
concerns reflect the danger in protecting an abstract notion of society 
or women generally, at the expense of the actual victims.90 
Domestic violence provides some helpful parallels to the issue 
presented by this Note, such as the concerns regarding continued 
abuse and coercion by the abuser or by the victim’s family. However, 
there are important distinctions as well. In domestic violence 
situations, the abuser and the victim often live under the same roof, 
magnifying concerns about abuse and coercion, whereas there are 
 
testifying if testimony is compelled. Id. at 253. 
 86. “If domestic violence is not combated, the cycle of violence will perpetuate itself 
through generations to come, leading to enormous economic demands on society.” Id. at 253. 
 87. “After all, criminal assault violates the laws of the state and should not be considered 
a private affair to be addressed or not, depending on a private party’s wishes.” Colb, supra note 
86.  
 88. See, e.g., Wendy McElroy, Don’t Jail Domestic Violence Victims, INDEPENDENT 
INSTITUTE, Dec. 14, 2005, http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=1638. 
 89. Id. McElroy criticizes states that require court ordered counseling to domestic 
violence victims reluctant to testify. She implies that during such counseling, victims are 
warned that they may be imprisoned if they refuse to testify. She further argues that this 
counseling constitutes “earlier and more subtle forms of coercing testimony,” and this insidious 
practice accounts for lack of awareness regarding the problem of compelled testimony, since 
rarely does the victim protest beyond the counseling session. Id. 
 90. “How can an imprisoned [victim] distinguish the court system from her abusive ex-
boyfriend, both of whom claim control of her life against her will?” Id. However, some 
commentators have pointed to the economic, not just the theoretical, burden on the state as a 
result of domestic violence issues. Rold, supra note 86, at 249 (noting that domestic violence 
“places great stress” on police departments, courts, medical personnel, mental health providers, 
social service providers, children, and employers, so prosecution and prevention is a high 
priority). 
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multiple scenarios in which an alleged victim called upon to testify 
against a family member may not be in such a position of 
helplessness.91  
2. Crimes Committed by Non-family Members 
No court has held that a victim of a crime committed by a non-
family member has a right to refuse to testify. Nevertheless, some 
courts have provided special rules for rape victims and child victims, 
and will often exercise discretion to allow alternative methods for 
these victims’ allegations and statements to come before the decision-
maker.92 The San Diego Police Department sums up the reasoning for 
compelled testimony by stating that, “[i]ndividuals who are crime 
victims or witnesses have a civic duty to testify in court to help 
convict and punish criminals. This is an essential element in our 
criminal justice system. Criminals cannot be prosecuted if 
community members fail to fulfill this responsibility.”93 This 
explanation relies on the theory that the purpose of the criminal 
justice system is primarily to uphold the laws, and to serve the 
interests of individual victims secondarily, or not at all. A more 
 
 91. The case that provides the backdrop for this Note is an excellent example of this. In 
that case, three factors distinguished it from a typical domestic violence situation where the 
batterer and victim continue to live in the same household. First, when the women were 
allegedly victimized, they did not live with their grandfather, the alleged abuser, but rather the 
prosecution alleged that they were abused during a visit. Second, when charges were brought, 
the women no longer lived in a home where their grandfather had access. Along the same lines, 
the women were adults with their own households and families at the time of their decision not 
to testify. See supra note 1. These factors play an important role in determining whether an 
alleged victim should be forced to testify against a family member. 
 92. See, e.g., supra notes 76–78 and accompanying text (regarding rape shield laws). See 
also Carol Schultz Vento, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Child 
Hearsay Statutes, 71 A.L.R. 5th 637 (1999) (discussing rules to allow admission of child 
hearsay statements into evidence to prevent further trauma to the child). These special rules can, 
however, create other constitutional difficulties, such as Confrontation Clause issues. See supra 
note 23. 
 93. City of San Diego, Helping to Convict and Punish Criminals, http://www.sandiego. 
gov/police/prevention/convict.shtml (last visited Feb. 16, 2007). See also Genesee County 
Prosecutor’s Office, Your Obligations and Responsibilities to Our Community as a Victim of 
Crime, http://www.co.genesee.mi.us/Prosecutors/CVS.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2007) (“As a 
victim of crime, your help is very important to our system of justice. When victims report a 
crime and testify, they help to make the community a safer place to live.”). 
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realistic (and humane) approach recognizes that the justice system is 
designed to do both. 
3. Intra-family Testimonial Privilege 
A very small number of decisions have recognized some form of 
intra-family, non-spousal, testimonial privilege.94 Such decisions 
have identified three potential harms if a family member is compelled 
to testify against another in a criminal proceeding. The first harm is 
the mental, physical, and emotional damage done to the individual 
refusing to testify, which results from the disavowal of the emotional 
debt family members owe one another.95 The second harm is the 
permanently detrimental effect to the family from such coercion.96 
The third harm is the damage to society as a whole from state 
intrusion into the family unit.97 Missouri has refused to recognize a 
parent-child testimonial privilege, reasoning that such a privilege 
should be created by the legislature, not the courts.98 
 
 94. See State v. Willoughby, 532 A.2d 1020, 1021 (Me. 1987) (finding that neither the 
United States nor Maine constitutions recognize a privilege not to testify in court about 
communications between a child and parents or between siblings, and therefore, there is no 
intrafamily testimonial privilege). In Willoughby, the court pointed to the paucity of authority 
on the subject, but noted that only one federal court and some lower New York state courts 
have recognized an intrafamily testimonial privilege. Id. at 1022. The federal court was the 
District of  Nevada. In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298 (D. Nev. 1983). See also Kelly Korell, 
Annotation, Testimonial Privilege for Confidential Communications Between Relatives Other 
than Husband and Wife—State Cases, 62 A.L.R. 5th 629 (1998) (“Most courts . . . have been 
unwilling to extend the rationale underlying the marital privilege to protect confidential 
communications between parents and children or other family members.”). 
 95. See In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. at 1300. The movant argued that as a child of his 
father, he was and will always remain emotionally indebted to his father as long as he lives, and 
untold suffering would result to him and his family unit if he were required to betray that debt. 
Id. 
 96. See id. at 1301–02. The movant urged that the family unit is considered inviolable in 
Western society, and that history and philosophy illustrate the importance of its sanctity and 
harmony. Id. Additionally, the movant argued that the parent-child or blood relationship is even 
more worthy of protection than a spousal bond, since spousal relationship is voluntary and 
capable of dissolution, whereas a parent-child relationship is lifelong and unbreakable. Id. 
 97. See id. at 1302. The movant argued that the breakdown of a family unit is a societal 
problem, and that open communication would protect the unit, and lead to better-adjusted 
children and families, and in turn improve modern society. Id. 
 98. State v. Bruce, 655 S.W.2d 66, 68 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983). 
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B. Proposal 
The tension among victims’ rights, victims’ safety, state interests, 
and the limits of the law precludes an easy answer to the question of 
whether alleged victims should have the right to refuse to testify 
against a family member accused of harming them. Ultimately, this 
question cannot be resolved with a simple “yes” or “no” answer. 
Rather, the courts should acknowledge and address the issue head-on, 
by taking into account multiple factors at two important stages. The 
first stage is at the time the prosecution first attempts to compel 
testimony from the unwilling alleged victim, whether by certifying 
the alleged victim as a witness or by applying for an immunity order 
so that the victim has no exception to claim for not testifying. The 
second stage is if and when the alleged victim refuses to take the 
stand or takes the stand and refuses to testify. This multi-factor 
process can account for the difficulties and nuances of the problem, 
and it is consistent with the privacy jurisprudence described above.  
When an alleged victim refuses to testify against a family 
member, the court should take into account the following factors: 
what the alleged victim says she or he wants and why; whether the 
alleged victim is dependent upon or subject to the control of the 
alleged abuser;99 whether other potential victims are dependent upon 
or subject to the control of the alleged abuser;100 the age of the 
alleged victim; the emotional and mental competence of the victim; 
any criminal history of the alleged abuser; how the alleged victim and 
alleged abuser are related;101 the religious beliefs of the alleged 
 
 99. This could include whether they live in same house, are financially dependent, or if 
the alleged abuser holds a position of authority. 
 100. Even if the alleged victim is now safely out of the home, for instance, whether 
younger siblings or other vulnerable people are still in potential harm’s way could be 
considered. 
 101. This could include whether the alleged victim and alleged abuser are immediate 
versus distant relatives, or blood or step relations. The importance of protecting the family unit 
could arguably be more compelling for immediate family, or for blood relations, but there is 
authority which challenges this notion. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 
494, 503–04 (1977) (holding that in the housing ordinance context, constitutional protection of 
the sanctity of family extended to grandsons, not confined within arbitrary boundary drawn at 
limits of nuclear family); Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 
844 (1977) (noting the importance of family relationships, not dependent on blood 
relationships, to the individuals involved and to society). 
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victim;102 the circumstances under which the alleged abuse was 
reported;103 and finally, any other evidence which might tend to 
indicate the potential for coercion from any source. These factors 
allow the judge to gauge the potential for overt or insidious coercion.  
As has been elaborated above, a victim should not be or feel re-
victimized by the judicial system; being imprisoned for making a 
choice about how to deal with events occurring in one’s own life may 
do just that. On the other hand, the judicial system is designed to 
protect victims who may not be able to make an informed choice, as 
well as society as a whole. It is unquestionable that when a victim 
refuses to testify out of fear for his or her own safety and well-being, 
society needs to intervene, possibly by compelling testimony.104 The 
more difficult situation arises when a victim’s refusal to testify is the 
result of a considered decision, such as forgiveness, the desire for 
family unity, the desire to move on with one’s life and not relive 
 
 102. In the case In re Agosto, the movant claimed a parent-child privilege partly on the 
basis of the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of religion. 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1300–01 
(D. Nev. 1983). He argued that he was bound by the Judeo-Christian fifth commandment to 
“honor thy father and mother,” and hence the government could not force him to testify against 
his father without violating the First Amendment. Id. 
 103. This is a difficult factor for a couple of reasons. First, whether the alleged victim 
reported the crime raises questions about whether, once reporting a crime, one has a duty to aid 
investigation and prosecution of it. On one hand, it is the reporter who has directly caused such 
investigation and prosecution, and in that sense, perhaps there is a measure of responsibility 
associated with the engagement of others. On the other hand, it would surely be bad policy to 
send the message that victims should forego reporting crimes and seeking help out of fear that 
doing so would permanently destroy any claim of privacy. Second, confrontation issues may 
arise. If an alleged victim is unconditionally allowed to report a crime (presumably giving some 
sort of statement, whether written or oral, to law enforcement or others) but not testify about it, 
the accused would have no opportunity to cross-examine his or her accuser, which may violate 
the accused’s Sixth Amendment rights. See supra note 23. Further exacerbating the problem, 
fear about false accusations is not entirely unfounded, making this Sixth Amendment 
deprivation even more serious in some situations. 
 104. This is a result of the above-discussed theory that victims are safer when they are 
compelled to testify than when it appears they are directly participating in the prosecution of 
their abuser. Rold, supra note 86, at 253 (“Incidents of further violence decrease when the 
spouse is compelled to testify.”) (citing Angela Corsilles, No-Drop Policies in the Prosecution 
of Domestic Violence Cases: Guarantee to Action or Dangerous Solution?, 63 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 853, 877 (1994)). One limitation to this theory is the extent to which abusers actually 
ponder the source of their problems rather than simply striking out at a vulnerable target, 
namely, the victim. This “rational choice” theory has been supported by various authorities, but 
like most theories, it probably does not play out in every case. See Corsilles, supra, at 874. 
Regardless, in no circumstances should an alleged victim be jailed merely for refusing to 
testify. 
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negative past experiences, and other similar reasons.105 In that case, 
the state still has an interest in upholding the law and prosecuting 
crimes, but it is urged here that such lofty goals do not outweigh the 
rights of the victim to control his or her own life decisions. Abuse at 
the hands of a family member is in many ways one of the most 
invasive crimes.106 A decision made absent coercion or fear regarding 
such an invasion should not be disregarded lightly. 
CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Amendment involves making choices about how to 
direct one’s life free of governmental interference.107 Those scholars 
who dismiss the Ninth Amendment as a legitimate basis for 
protecting rights not expressly enumerated elsewhere in the 
Constitution have forgotten the warning that “[i]t cannot be presumed 
that any clause in the [C]onstitution is intended to be without 
effect.”108 Countervailing considerations, such as those described 
above, demonstrate that an absolute right of an alleged victim to 
refuse to testify against a family member can do more harm than 
good, both to society at large and to the victims themselves. 
However, alleged victims should have the ability to make considered 
decisions regarding the prosecution of their alleged abusers, and such 
an ability most naturally flows from a right to privacy. The Ninth 
Amendment provides a basis for this privacy right, and constitutional 
scholarship should not overlook this basis without careful 
consideration.  
 
 105. An interesting question raised by this hypothetical is whether this Note and other 
articles advocating expansion of the Ninth Amendment’s protections would be more or less 
successful if the right protected by the Ninth Amendment was articulated as “personal 
autonomy” rather than “privacy.” 
 106. See, e.g., Rape, Abuse, & Incest National Network, http://www.rainn.org/types-of-
assault/sexual-assault/incest.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2007) (“Incest is considered by many 
experts to be a particularly damaging form of sexual abuse because it is perpetrated by 
individuals whom the victim trusts and depends upon.”). 
 107. The right to privacy is a fundamental personal right that is “protected from abridgment 
by the Government though not specifically mentioned in the Constitution.” Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495–96 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
 108. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 490–91 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 
(1803)). 
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In Missouri, many factors compel the conclusion that some 
protections for victims beyond those currently offered should be 
provided.109 The multi-factor approach described in this Note is one 
way to balance policy considerations with an important constitutional 
right.  
 
 109. Namely, the inadequate victims’ rights provisions, supra notes 17–18 and 
accompanying text; the dilemma posed by the witness immunity laws, supra notes 20, 21–22 
and accompanying text; and the fact that two adult women were jailed for refusing to testify 
about alleged events that allegedly happened when they were children, supra note 1 and 
accompanying text. 
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